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A B S T R A C T
Corruption in government procurement programs is a perennial problem. The paper by
Dean Neu, Jeff Everett and Abu Shiraz Rahaman emphasises the value of internal controls
in government departments in constraining individuals and promoting ethical conduct. In
response, this paper argues that good internal controls in government departments,
though highly desirable, are unlikely to make a signiﬁcant dent in corrupt practices to
secure government contracts. A major reason for this is the supply of corruption by
corporations keen to secure lucrative contracts. Within the spirit of contemporary
capitalism, they have an insatiable appetite for proﬁts and have shown willingness to
engage in corrupt practices to secure government departments. The issues are illustrated
with the aid of two case studies. It is argued that the supply-side of corruption severely
limits the possibilities of preventing corruption in government procurement.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In a world of secrecy and easymobility of money, elites seek personal riches, power, status and competitive advantage by
renting inﬂuence through illicit means. The volume and extent of corrupt activities is hard to know (Serra & Wantchekon,
2012), but is estimated to be running at around $2.6 trillion a year (European Commission, 2011). These amounts are large
enough to make a signiﬁcant difference to economic, social and political policymaking, and the quality of life of citizens. As
governments are one of the biggest spenders in any economy, considerable institutional attention is focused on controlling
corrupt practices by government ofﬁcials in granting public contracts (for example, see Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2005, 2010; United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, 2003). A common recommendation
for reform is enhanced surveillance which ‘‘strengthens accountability so that government ofﬁcials can be held responsible
for the proper implementation of public procurement rules and regulations and the decisions they make in actual
procurement cases. Such accountability requires a credible sanctioning system for violations of rules with adequate internal
controls and audit procedures; a complaints system for bidders as well as appropriate administrative; and judicial review
bodies attributed with the authority to impose corrective measures’’ (European Commission, 2013: 260).§ We are grateful to John Roberts for his insightful comments.
* Corresponding author at: Centre for Global Accountability, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK.
E-mail address: prems@essex.ac.uk (P. Sikka).
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YCPAC-1886; No. of Pages 9The above themes are present in the paper by Neu, Everett and Rahaman (2015) which shines a light on the possibility of
discouraging and combating corrupt practices within the government procurement process. In Foucaldian traditions, the
hope is that ethical subjects/individuals can be produced through suitably designed internal controls and surveillance
systems which give visibility to departures from the established norms. Towards this end, government departments are
urged to implement and enforce a variety of managerialist techniques and performance indicators, including procedures for
risk assessment, training, sanctions, self-reviews and reports by internal and external auditors. The Big Brother approach
implicit in the paper presupposes that individuals can be coerced to internalize some value systems and, in the process,
somehowbecome ethical citizens. The surveillance systems advocated byNeu, Everett and Rahaman (2015) portrayed as are
universal and are thought to be applicable across almost all cultures regardless of social tensions, legitimacy of the state and
networks of power. Internal controls seek to produce a kind of stability and certainty by binding individuals within a system
of governance, but they can always be resisted by those able to game or subvert them for personal gain. Some might even
comply merely to gain advantage from compliance rather than necessarily embrace the ethical positions envisaged by the
paper. The paper’s recommendations might constrain some corrupt practices, but the gains are likely to be modest because
internal controls aimed at individuals cannot stiﬂe systemic pressures for proﬁts and personal riches.
This paper seeks to extend the debate by Neu, Everett and Rahaman by arguing that public procurement controls, no
matter howwell designed, are unlikely to signiﬁcantly reduce corruption in the present social environment. The Neu, Everett
and Rahaman paper assumes that government ofﬁcials indulge in illicit activity and primarily focuses on the demand-side of
corruption. However, government ofﬁcials cannot be corrupt on their own. There is a supply-side and another party has to
collude and be willing and able to supply bribes under a cloak of secrecy to secure government contracts (UK Africa All Party
Parliamentary Group, 2006). The supply-side primarily resides in large western corporations. George Soros, an international
ﬁnancier adds that ‘‘international business is generally themain source of corruption1’’ and Transparency International adds
that ‘‘bribe money often stems from multinationals based in the world’s richest countries’’ (Transparency International,
2007: 2). In many cases, the corporations have revenues bigger than the gross domestic product of nation-states, and have
access to a vast network of subsidiaries, afﬁliates and advisers to camouﬂage their activities. In pursuit of competitive
advantage, some corporations and their executives have shown awillingness to subvert laws, international treaties andwell
designed internal controls instituted in government procurement programs (Boulton, 1979; Chatterjee, 2009). Thus,
corruption in government procurement cannot easily be checked without constraints on the supply-side of corruption.
To advance its arguments, this paper is divided into three further sections. The ﬁrst section explains the supply-side of
corruption and pressures that persuade corporations and their executives to engage in corrupt practices. The second section
provides two case studies relating to the supply-side of corruption and the tactics used by global corporations to secure
government contracts. The ﬁrst case relates to Hewlett-Packard (HP), a US-based company, selling computer hardware and
software to individuals, corporations and government departments. It operates in a market ‘‘where it is possible to ﬁnd a
market price for a comparable item’’ (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015: 22) and thus, has benchmarks for checking illicit
practices. The second case study relates to BAE Systems plc, a UK-based company, operating in the arms industry, and for
‘‘more than a century across the entire globe, the weapons business has been a dirty business’’ (Naylor, 1998: 35; also see
Gilby, 2014). BAE sells high-priced products, often specialized products, where it may be ‘‘difﬁcult to determine a market
price with the end result that a space is created for corruption to occur’’ (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015: 6). Both companies
are headquartered in countries classiﬁed as comparatively less corrupt in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 published
by Transparency International.2 The third section concludes the paper with some reﬂections and suggestions for disrupting
the supply of corruption.
2. Understanding supply-side corruption
Almost every state prohibits the use of corrupt practices to secure government contracts and considerable efforts have
been made to regulate the conduct of government ofﬁcials associated with the procurement process (Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005, 2010; United Nations Ofﬁce for Drugs and Crime, 2003). Much of the
regulatory architecture is devoted to the design of internal controls and surveillance techniques to constrain government
ofﬁcials who are often conceptualized as deviant, greedy, opportunistic and lacking in self-control. The constraints on
individuals may curb some who ﬁnd illicit practices attractive, but also obscure the extent to which institutional structures
and norms provide opportunities and motives for corruption. A focus upon government ofﬁcials obscures the supply-side of
corruption which primarily resides in corporations providing goods and services to government departments. Internal
controls applicable to government departments can be checked and enforced by state auditors and scrutinized by
parliamentary committees. However, the state is largely excluded from directing the inner workings of corporations
(Habermas, 1976) and has little power to directly enforce or scrutinize internal controls operating within corporations. The
design and implementation of internal controls within corporations is considered to be a private matter for their executives,
though the state can exert pressures for higher quality internal controls through laws, threats of ﬁnes and punishment for1 Financial Times, Fund Management Guru Reveals Doubts, 8 December 1998.
2 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ Accessed 09.06.14.
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YCPAC-1886; No. of Pages 9transgressors, and the debarring of some companies from securing government contracts. Such pressures cannot easily be
applied when corporations reside in another country or wield considerable ﬁnancial and political resources.
Corporations operate according to the logics of competition and private proﬁt. Periodic ﬁnes and punishments do not
appear to have dulled the appetite for using corrupt practices to secure government contracts (Boulton, 1979; Chatterjee,
2009; Cragg & Woof, 2002; European Commission, 2013; Passas, 2007; Robins, 2012). Corporations engage in corrupt
practices for threemajor reasons: tomaintain higher prices, tomaintain amarket for outdated products, and to remain in the
ﬁeld of competition, especially if further sales can be secured at a later date (Moody-Stuart, 1997). Corrupt practices may
enable corporations to mediate incessant pressures from markets for higher sales, proﬁts and market shares. However,
manner ofmediation depends on contemporary institutional structures and value systems. Arguably, neoliberalismhas been
in ascendancy since the second half of twentieth century (Harvey, 2005). It has reconstructed nation states, corporations,
communities and individuals as competitive beings engaged in the endless pursuit of privatewealth and consumptionwhich
would somehow lead to vast increases in efﬁciency, afﬂuence and happiness. The spirit of neoliberalism is inculcated into
every organization and individual through a relentless focus on output measurements of performance, which subjects
individuals to a disciplinary regime of surveillance techniques, performance targets, evaluations, appraisals and rewards
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005). Such practices normalize the logic of competition and private gain, and performance-related
pay has become the norm for business executives. As the typical tenure of a chief executive at a major company is about
4.8 years,3 there is a temptation to collect as much reward as quickly as possible. The shortness of the tenure in ofﬁce means
that executives rarely have to face the consequences of any illicit practices, assuming that they are discovered. In any case,
the ﬁnes, if any, are generally levied on corporations rather than individuals. In this environment, ‘bending the rules’ for
personal gain is increasingly seen as a sign of business acumen. Stealing a march on competitors, at almost any price, is
lauded as an entrepreneurial skill, especially where competitive pressures link proﬁts, promotion, niches and salaries with
meeting business targets (Sikka, 2008). In the absence of effective moral constraints, any deal is considered to be acceptable
as long as it is proﬁtable and shame resides in being caught rather than engaging in corrupt activity. The consequences of
such an entrepreneurial culture are noted in a UK government report which states that at somemajor corporations, directors
have a ‘‘. . . cynical disregard of laws and regulations . . . cavalier misuse of company monies . . . a contempt for truth and
common honesty’’ (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1997: 309). The above provides the context for understanding the
two case studies and reﬂections on whether internal controls can constrain corporations from using corrupt practices to
secure government contracts.
3. Two case studies
This section provides brief details of two case studies which show that the lure of private proﬁts and personal gains is not
constrained by internal controls. The transactions in the case studies have taken place at a time when there is an extensive
regulatory architecture requiring companies to implement effective internal controls and discourage corrupt practices. This
includes a variety of laws such as the UK’s Fraud Act 2006, Companies Act 2006 and the Bribery Act 2010. The US has the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. These laws reﬂect and have also inﬂuenced the
1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials.4 In addition, auditing standards in most countries
require auditors to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of internal controls (for example, Financial Reporting Council,
1995). These requirements should focus executive attention on the need for legal and ethical conduct, but too many
corporations have been cited for their participation in corrupt practices (Cragg & Woof, 2002).
3.1. Hewlett-Packard
HP operates from 770 sites in 95 countries.5 In April 2014, the company paid a ﬁne of $108 million for violation of the US
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.6 The charges related to the payment of bribes to secure government contracts in Russia, Poland
and Mexico.7 The court judgment provides some details of the practices and encourages reﬂections on the extent of
corporate practices used to pursue proﬁts (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014).
During the period 2000–2007, the Russian subsidiary of HP (hereafter HP Russia) paid bribes through agents and
consultants to government ofﬁcials in Russia to secure contracts for computer hardware and software worth an estimated
s35 million ($42 million). HP Russia was keen to secure this contract with the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor of General of Russia
because it was seen as a ‘golden key’ for unlocking further contracts of around $100 million (US Securities and Exchange3 The Daily Telegraph, ‘CEOs must keep learning to avoid the ﬁve-year axe’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/businessclub/management-advice/
10064862/CEOs-must-keep-learning-to-avoid-the-ﬁve-year-axe.html Accessed 03.06.14.
4 For some details see http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/about/about-corruption/the-oecd-convention-on-combating-bribery-of-
foreign-public-ofﬁcials-in-international-business-transactions.aspx.
5 As per http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/media/ﬁles/hp_fy11_gcr_hp_operations.pdf Accessed 18.05.14.
6 US Securities and Exchange Commission press release, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard With FCPA Violations, 9 April 2014 (http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075# U6GC6FRwaic Accessed 18.05.14).
7 US Justice Department press release, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery, 9 April 2014 (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/April/14-crm-358.html Accessed 17.05.14).
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YCPAC-1886; No. of Pages 9Commission, 2014: 3). To secure the contract, HP Russia created a secret slush fund to facilitate bribes to government ofﬁcials
directly, as well as through agents and intermediaries. HP Russia created excess proﬁt margins for the slush fund through an
elaborate buy-back deal structure (US Department of Justice, 2014), whereby (1) HP sold the computer hardware and other
technology products called for under the contract to a Russian channel partner, (2) HP bought the same products back from
an intermediary company at a nearlys8millionmark-up and paid the intermediary an additionals4.2million for purported
services, and (3) HP sold the same products to the Russian government at the increased price. The payments to the
intermediary were made through a series of shell companies, some of which were directly associated with government
ofﬁcials, registered in the US, the UK, the British Virgin Islands and Belize. Some monies were laundered through offshore
bank accounts in Switzerland, Lithuania, Latvia and Austria. Portions of the funds were spent on travel, cars, jewelry,
clothing, expensive watches, swimming pool technology, furniture, household appliances and other luxury goods for
government ofﬁcials. To conceal the corrupt payment, HP Russia employees kept two sets of books (US Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2014: 5): (i) an internal set of documents that identiﬁed the recipients of the payments, and (ii) a
sanitized version of the same documents that were provided to management in the credit, ﬁnance, and legal ofﬁces outside
of HP Russia. There were also off-the-books side agreements. As one example, an HP Russia executive executed a letter
agreement to pay s2.8 million in purported ‘‘commission’’ fees to a UK-registered shell company which was linked to a
director of the Russian government agency responsible for managing the project. HP Russia did not disclose the existence of
the agreement to internal or external auditors or management outside of HP Russia. At one stage, HP Russia’s country
manager signed a contract which was being handled by an HP subsidiary in Germany even though he had no authority, or
power of attorney, to act on behalf of the German subsidiary.When, threemonths later, the German subsidiary learnt of this,
it ratiﬁed the contract through a retroactive power of attorney. HP Russia made about $10.4 million in illicit proﬁts from its
Russian contract (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014: 5).
The tactic of bribing government ofﬁcials to secure contracts was also used in Poland (US Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2014). US court documents show that between 2006 and 2010, HP Poland made improper payments to one or
more government ofﬁcials to secure andmaintain lucrative government contracts with the Polish national police agency. HP
Poland’s employees, including senior ofﬁcials, circumvented internal controls to provide free laptop and desktop computers,
iPods, ﬂat screen televisions, cameras, home theater systems, dinners, ﬂights and sightseeing tours to government ofﬁcials.
Many of these were paid in cash, without authorization, and were not properly recorded in HP’s books and accounts. After
some initial lucrative contracts, HP Poland employees and agents expanded the bribes to include large cash payments from
off-book accounts and the government ofﬁcials were promised 1.2% of net revenue from the relevant contracts. When, in
March 2007, a Polish ofﬁcial signed a contract valued at $15.8million, a bag containing $150,000 in cashwas left at his home.
A further $100,000 in cash was handed over in a Warsaw parking lot, followed by further cash payments of $360,000. The
relationship was also cultivated through covert means. In one method, a HP Poland executive established multiple
anonymous e-mail accounts and shared the passwords with the Polish IT Ofﬁcial so that he couldwrite and savemessages as
‘‘drafts’’ within the account. The HP Poland executive also provided the Polish government ofﬁcial with prepaid mobile
telephones. The HP Poland executive and the government ofﬁcial also met in remote locations where they would
communicate silently by typing information on a laptop computer about upcoming tenders and bribes. Through corrupt
means, HP Poland secured contracts worth approximately $60 million and generated proﬁts of about $16.1 million.
The tendency to secure government contracts through illicit payments is also encountered in Mexico (US Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2014). Here hardware, software and licensing contracts worth $6million were sought withMexico’s
state-owned petroleum company, PetroleosMexico. Once again, agents were cultivated and paid secret fees, this time called
‘‘inﬂuencer fee’’. This was equivalent to 25% of the licensing and support components of the deal. There was no written
agreement with the agent selected and the amounts were passed through shell companies and records were falsiﬁed. HP
Mexico made $2.5 million proﬁt from the deals.
Commenting on the $108 million ﬁne for HP, a spokesperson for the Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement
division said that ‘‘Hewlett-Packard lacked the internal controls to stop a pattern of illegal payments to win business in
Mexico and Eastern Europe. The company’s books and records reﬂected the payments as legitimate commissions and
expenses. Companies have a fundamental obligation to ensure that their internal controls are both reasonably designed and
appropriately implemented across their entire business operations, and they should take a hard look at the agents
conducting business on their behalf’’.8 Ernst & Young were the global auditors of HP throughout the period during which
corrupt payments were made. The company always received unqualiﬁed audit opinion.
3.2. BAE Systems plc
BAE Systems plc9 (BAES) is theworld’s second largest defence contractor. It exports a wide range of products and services
for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electronics, security, information technology and support services. It has
customers in over 100 countries, thoughmost of its business is based around four keymarkets – the US, the UK, the Kingdom8 The Guardian, Hewlett-Packard to pay $108m to settle scandal over bribery of public ofﬁcials, 9 April 2014 (http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2014/apr/09/hewlett-packard-108m-corruption-government-it-us-bribery Accessed 15.06.14).
9 It is the successor company formed in 1999 after the merger of British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic System.
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example, The Guardian newspaper has claimed that ‘‘Three huge BAE deals with the Saudi royal family kept Britain’s sole
warplane manufacturer in proﬁtable existence in the 1960s and 70s. All were corrupt . . . successive UK governments,
desperate for foreign exchange, took no notice’’.11 In 1985, the UK and Saudi governments signed a government-to-
government contract12 known as the Al Yamamah contract. The £43 billion contract was Britain’s biggest ever arms export
deal and BAE Systems would provide Tornado and Hawk jets and other military equipment. It was soon alleged that the
Prime Minister’s son, Mark Thatcher, received kickbacks for the contract.13 In 1989, amidst allegations of the payment of
secret commissions to a number of agents and Saudi royals, the National Audit Ofﬁce14 (NAO) began an investigation.15 In
1992, the investigation was abruptly discontinued and the report remains unpublished ‘‘amidst fears that its publication
would offend the notoriously sensitive Saudis, jeopardizing continuing trade relations’’.16 In 2004, it was reported that BAE’s
chief operating ofﬁcer operated a ‘‘slush fund’’ which made corrupt payments of £60 million to Saudi ofﬁcials, including
providing prostitutes, Rolls-Royces and Californian holidays.17 The company allegedly used an elaborate process of false
accounting tomake and conceal payments through shell companies. Some of the entries were in code in order to conceal the
identity of the recipients. BAE’s response to allegations was a response that it ‘‘can state categorically that there is not now
and there has never been in existencewhat themedia refers to as a ‘slush fund’. Neither has BAE Systems or any of its ofﬁcers
or employees been involved in false accounting’’.18
The media revelations, accompanied by documentary evidence, persuaded the Serious Fraud Ofﬁce19 (SFO) to launch an
investigation. On 1st December 2006, it was reported that ‘‘Saudi Arabia has given Britain 10 days to halt a fraud
investigation into the country’s arms trade . . . The country’s advisers have made clear through diplomatic channels that
unless the inquiry is closed, the kingdom’s arms business will be taken elsewhere’’.20 In 14 December 2006, the Attorney
General told parliament that the investigation had been abandoned because of the ‘‘need to safeguard national and
international security. It has been necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the wider public
interest’’.21 Prime Minister Tony Blair defended the action by saying that ‘‘the result would have been devastating for our
relationship with an important country’’.22 The US authorities,23 which had launched an investigation in 2005, were not
pleased24 and made a formal protest to the UK government.
Attention was now focused on the US investigation into BAE Systems Inc., the US subsidiary of BAE System plc, for its role
in the Saudi arms deal, as well as contracts for supplies to South Africa, Chile, the Czech Republic, Romania, Tanzania and
Qatar. On 1st March 2010, the US Department of Justice announced that BAE Systems plc had pleaded guilty to conspiring to
defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its lawful functions and making false statements about its Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act compliance program, and violating the Arms Export Control Act and International Trafﬁc in Arms
Regulations. BAE was ordered to pay a $400 million criminal ﬁne.25 The court order (United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, 2010) relating to sales in Saudi Arabia, Hungary and the Czech Republic stated that ‘‘BAES knowingly
and willfully failed to identify commissions paid to third parties for assistance in the solicitation or promotion or otherwise
to secure the conclusion of the sale of defense articles . . .’’ (p. 6). In the company’s records, themiddlemenwere described as
‘‘marketing advisers’’ and BAES took active steps to conceal its relationshipswith them. BAES used onshore and offshore shell10 As per http://bae-systems-investor-relations-v2.production.investis.com/bae-systems-at-glance.aspx Accessed 19.05.14.
11 As per http://www.theguardian.com/baeﬁles/page/0,,2095814,00.html Accessed 21.05.14.
12 In legal terms, thismeans that BAE sold equipment to theUK government, which then sold it to the government of Saudi Arabia. As the sale is technically
by the government, this entitles UK government auditors (e.g. the National Audit Ofﬁce) to scrutinize the process.
13 The Independent, Mark Thatcher accused: Sources say he got 12m pounds from arms deal signed by his mother, 9 October 1004 (http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/mark-thatcher-accused-sources-say-he-got-12m-pounds-from-arms-deal-signed-by-his-mother-1441851.html Accessed
20.05.14).
14 It is a Parliamentary body independent of any UK government departments which scrutinizes public spending by government departments,
government agencies and non-government pubic bodies.
15 The Daily Telegraph, BAE’s arms deals with Saudi Arabia: Timeline, 30 July 2008 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
saudiarabia/2473238/BAEs-arms-deals-with-Saudi-Arabia-Timeline.html Accessed 25.05.14).
16 The Daily Telegraph, SFO illegally dropped Saudi arms inquiry, judge rules, 10 April 2008 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584595/
SFO-illegally-dropped-Saudi-arms-inquiry-judge-rules.html Accessed 23.05.14).
17 The Guardian, BAE chief linked to slush fund, 5 October 2004 (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/oct/05/saudiarabia.armstrade Accessed
24.05.14).
18 BBC News, BBC lifts the lid on secret BAE slush fund, 5 October 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3712770.stm Accessed 19.11.14).
19 SFO is a government department charged with investigation and prosecution of serious or complex fraud, and corruption.
20 The Daily Telegraph, Halt inquiry or we cancel Euroﬁghters, 1 December 2006 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1535683/
Halt-inquiry-or-we-cancel-Euroﬁghters.html Accessed 20.05.14).
21 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 14 December 2006, col. 1712 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm
Accessed 01.06.14).
22 The Guardian, Dropping BAE inquiry vital to national interest, says Blair, 16 January 2007 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/16/bae.
immigrationpolicy Accessed 01.06.14).
23 Financial Times, US issued protest on axing of BAE probe, 27 April 2007 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b008fd02-f45c-11db-88aa-000b5df10621.
html#axzz355ZUUp36 Accessed 01.06.14).
24 UK NGOs made attempts to force the government to continue with its investigations, but were ultimately unsuccessful (The Guardian, Lords rule SFO
was lawful in halting BAE arms corruption inquiry, 30 July 2008; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/30/bae.armstrade Accessed 30.05.14).
25 US Department of Justice press release, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine, 1 March 2010 (http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html Accessed 03.06.14).
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was little internal scrutiny of the payments. The court order noted that ‘‘BAES established one entity in the British Virgin
Islands to conceal BAES’s marketing advisor relationships, including who the agent was and how much it was paid; to
create obstacles for investigating authorities to penetrate the arrangements; to circumvent laws in countries that did not
allow agency relationships; and to assist advisors in avoiding tax liability for payments from BAES’’ (p. 8). BAES’s ofﬁcial
records maintained inadequate information about the identity of the advisors and the nature of their work and, frequently
the communication was not in writing. Between May and November 2001 alone, BAES made payments of over
£135,000,000 (about $216 million) and over $14,000,000 to certain of its marketing advisors and agents through offshore
entities. (p. 9). There is little persuasive evidence to show that the advisers performed legitimate activities to justify the
receipt of substantial payments. Amongst other things, the court order noted that for the Saudi contract, BAES provided
substantial beneﬁts to one public ofﬁcial and his associates (p. 12). These included ‘‘sums totaling more than £10,000,000
and more than $9,000,000 to a bank account in Switzerland controlled by an intermediary’’ (p. 13). For the contract to
supply Grippen ﬁghter planes to the Czech Republic and Hungary, BAES made payments of more than £19,000,000 to
entities associated with an unnamed agent. BAES made ‘‘these payments even though there was a high probability that
part of the payments would be used in the tender process to favor BAES’’ (p. 9–10). In May 2011, the US government levied
another ﬁne of $79 million on BAE for violation of defense export controls26 for the period 1997–2010 (United States
Department of State, 2011).
In December 2010, the UK authorities announced that BAE had agreed tomake an ex-gratia payment of £29.5 million to
the Tanzanian government, which the company’s 2011 annual report referred to as a ‘‘charitable contribution27’’ to be
used for educating children in Tanzania.28 A ﬁne of £500,000 was negotiated by the UK authorities for failing to ‘‘keep
adequate accounting records29 in relation to a defence contract for the supply of an air trafﬁc control system to the
Government of Tanzania’’.30 The background is that, in 1999, BAE, with the support of the UK government, entered into an
agreement with the Tanzanian government to supply an air trafﬁc control system at the price of about $40 million (£28
million). The UK government helped to secure the ﬁnance from Barclays Bank.31 The World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund opposed the deal by arguing that an effective radar system should only cost about $10 million32 (£7
million). The UK court order33 for the ﬁne provides some details of the discrepancies. Some $12.4 million (30% of the
contract value) ended up in two offshore companies operated by an agent. The payments were recorded in accounting
records by BAE as payments for the provision of technical services by the agent. The court documentation noted that
‘‘there was a high probability that part of the $12.4 million would be used in the negotiation process to favor British
Aerospace Defence Systems Ltd. The payments were not subjected to proper or adequate scrutiny or review’’ (para 4.5).
The failure to record the information accurately was the result of a deliberate decision by ofﬁcials. Despite the admission
that the company had failed to keep adequate accounting records, its annual ﬁnancial statements continued to receive
unqualiﬁed audit opinions. The judge expressed his surprise that the UK’s law enforcement ofﬁcers had given BAE ofﬁcials
blanket immunities from any future prosecutions.
In October 2010, the UK’s accounting regulator, the Financial Reporting Council, announced that it would investigate
audits and professional services advice provided by KPMG to BAE in the period 1997–2007, but in 2013, the investigation
was abruptly abandoned because ‘‘proper assessment of KPMG’s conductwould require consideration ofwork undertaken in
earlier years. Because there is no realistic prospect that a Tribunal will make an adverse ﬁnding in respect of a complaint
relating to work done so long ago it has been concluded that it is not in the public interest to extend the investigation to the
years preceding 1997’’.34
4. Summary and discussion
Itmay be possible to design internal controls systems that enhance possibilities of combating corrupt practiceswithin the
government procurement process. However, government departments transact with private sector corporations who
compete to secure government contracts. Corporations are under incessant pressure from markets and shareholders for26 Also seeWall Street Journal, BAE Pays $79Million To Settle CaseWith State Department, 17May 2011(http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/
05/17/bae-pays-79-million-to-settle-case-with-state-department/ Accessed 22.06.14).
27 Page 49 of the 2011 annual report, Available at http://bae-systems-investor-relations-v2.production.investis.com//media/Files/B/
BAE-Systems-Investor-Relations-V2/PDFs/results-and-reports/reports/2012a/ar-2011.pdf Accessed 20.06.14.
28 SeriousFraudOfﬁcepress release,BAESystemswillpaytowardeducatingchildren inTanzaniaafter signinganagreementbrokeredbytheSeriousFraudOfﬁce,
15 March 2012 (http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/bae-systems-will-pay-towards-educating-children-
in-tanzania-after-signing-an-agreement-brokered-by-the-serious-fraud-ofﬁce.aspx Accessed 17.06.14).
29 This was a statutory requirement under Section 221 of the Companies Act 1985.
30 Serious Fraud Ofﬁce press release, BAE ﬁned in Tanzania defence contract case, 21 December 2010 (http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/
press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/bae-ﬁned-in-tanzania-defence-contract-case.aspx Accessed 02.06.14).
31 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 25 June 2002, cols. 228–236.
32 BBC News, World Bank hits out at Tanzania deal, 22 December 2001 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1723296.stm Accessed 23.05.14).
33 R and BAE Systems PLC [2010] EWMisc 16 (CC) (21 December 2010) Available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2010/16.pdf Accessed 03.06.14.
34 Financial Reporting Council press release, Closure of investigation into the conduct of: KPMG Audit plc, Member Firm of the ICAEW, 1 August 2013;
https://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2013/August/Closure-of-investigation-into-the-conduct-of-KPMG.aspx Accessed 31.05.14).
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YCPAC-1886; No. of Pages 9higher proﬁts and have to distinguish themselves from their competitors. One way of stealing a march on competitors is by
using illicit means to secure sales to government departments. Following the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, corporate executives should be aware of their
obligations and possible retribution for bribing government ofﬁcials to secure contracts, but they still indulge in corrupt
practices. The two case studies presented in this paper show that corporationswent to enormous lengths to bribe individuals
to secure contracts. Some employees may have resisted illicit practices, but corporate ofﬁcials used clandestine meetings,
bags full of cash, agents, shell companies and false accounting to pursue corporate interests. These were not the actions of
some isolated individuals, but seem to be deliberate policies crafted at senior levels. No executive has been ﬁned,
imprisoned, or forced to return the personal gains made from corrupt practices. The supply of corruption is so deeply
ingrained into corporate governance structures that some companies even employ private detectives to recover bribes if the
recipients fail to deliver the promised beneﬁts (Hawley, 2000).
Following Neu, Everett and Rahaman (2015) arguments, it may be possible to use market prices as benchmarks to detect
artiﬁcial and inﬂated prices, but the case studies suggest that this process may not work smoothly. Major corporations
dominate markets, and have considerable discretion in setting prices, especially if markets are fragmented, or
compartmentalized into geographical jurisdictions (Sikka & Willmott, 2010). HP deployed an elaborate scheme to inﬂate
market prices for computer hardware and software. The creation of artiﬁcial prices requires collusion between the buyer
and the seller. The buyer was subject to internal controls instituted by government departments, whilst the seller was
driven by the logic of private proﬁts. HP’s books and internal controls could not be inspected by the governments of Russia,
Poland andMexico. In any case, the accounting records could not easily distinguish between the normal and illicit practices.
In the case of the Tanzanian contract, BAE priced its radar system at $40 million against an expected price of around $10
million. Despite this discrepancy, the sale went ahead with the full support of the UK government, and corrupt practices
were not checked.
None of the corrupt practices highlighted in this paper were brought to the attention of the public or regulators by
internal or external auditors of the companies even though they are central to debates about controlling corruption in
government procurement. Both HP and BAE bolstered internal checks and balances with audit committees and non-
executive directors, but they do not appear to have been effective in curtailing or exposing corrupt practices. Even if suitable
internal controls could be devised to combat both the demand and supply of corruption, they are most likely to constrain
selected individuals. They cannot easily make a serious dent in the systemic origins of corrupt practices which are
embedded in the spirit of contemporary capitalism that celebrates competition, individualization and quest for personal
riches.
Government auditors and law enforcement agencies may have the capacity to check corrupt practices, but the reality is
murkier. In the case of BAE, the UK state went to considerable length to thwart investigations. The NAO, the government
auditor, was prevented from investigating the frauds. In pursuit of what the government called ‘‘national’’ interests, the SFO,
a law enforcement agency, was neutered. The UK government granted immunities to BAE ofﬁcials from future investigations
and prosecutions. Seemingly, the commercial interests of BAE and its capacity to export arms took priority over attempts to
combat corruption. There is something very troubling for democratic sensibilities in that the UK government’s interventions
to prevent investigations of corrupt practices were accompanied by the claims that the rule of law is not compatible with
pursuit of the public interest and exposure of corrupt practices. Such worldviews pose serious questions about the
willingness of western states to eradicate the supply of corruption.
There is mounting evidence that internal controls are probably not constraining corporate participation in predatory
practices (for example, see Hadden et al., 2014; Mitchell & Sikka, 2011). Interestingly, the controls and disciplinary practices
are mobilized to enact a theater of legality and probity. In the case of HP, its 2013 ﬁnancial statements identiﬁed some of the
on-going litigation and investigations under the heading of ‘litigation and contingencies’, but with minimal detail. The word
‘‘bribery’’ appeared only three times in a 180 page document. The company’s 2013 ‘Living Progress Report’ (its corporate
social responsibility report) stated that ‘‘HP does not tolerate corrupt behavior and prohibits bribery or kickbacks in any
circumstance. Corrupt behavior is an impediment to social and economic development. It undermines the values on which
HP is built, the principles of fair competition, and the rule of law’’.35 BAE response was interesting. In 2007, it appointed a
committee of grandees, chaired by LordWoolf of Barnes, former Lord Chief Justice of England andWales. The eventual report
(Woolf Committee, 2008) provided a brief glimpse of the already publicly known allegations, but was accompanied by
denial. The report said that the ‘‘Company has always maintained that it does not believe that it has done anything that
would constitute a criminal offense . . . [and that the payments] ‘‘were lawful commissions and not secret payments’’ (Woolf
Committee, 2008: 8). The report made 23 recommendations for the company to improve ethical practices, something that
has become a resource for the company in reassuring its critics,36 especially after the ﬁnes imposed by the US government.
The recommendations, such as those relating to staff training, adherence to ethical codes, a new code of government
lobbying, enhanced role for internal audit, a register for gifts and hospitality and linking of executive remuneration to ethical
practices etc., reinforce disciplinary technologies and also create possibilities for ﬁnding scapegoats in future episodes. This35 HP2013Living Progress Report, p. 22 (http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetPDF.aspx/c04152740.pdf Accessed 15.06.14).
36 For example, see ‘‘Governance Summary’’ in the BAE’s 2013 annual report on page 64 (http://bae-systems-investor-relations-v2.production.investis.
com//media/Files/B/BAE-Systems-Investor-Relations-V2/Annual%20Reports/BAE-annual-report-2013.pdf Accessed 20.11.14).
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cannot easily check the supply-side of corruption.
The central message of this paper is that there are limits to the effectiveness of internal controls in government
procurement programs. The controls can be undermined not only by strategically placed ofﬁcials from within, but by the
constant attacks from private sector corporations transacting with the government departments. So what can be done to
control the supply-side corruption? Perhaps the offending companies, in this case HP and BAE could be debarred for a long
period from securing any government contracts, but in the face of strong corporate lobbying, such laws are unlikely to
emerge. Their executives could be personally ﬁned and extradited to the countries suffering from corrupt practices, but such
international laws and treaties either do not exist or are weak. To prevent a country like the UK from delaying, obfuscating
and abandoning investigations, there should be joint investigations involving the supply-side and demand-side countries.
Following the examples in case studies this could have been a joint investigation involving the US, Russia Poland andMexico,
or the UK, Saudi Arabia and Tanzania. However, even that runs into difﬁculties, as some countries (Saudi Arabia) were not
keen on any investigation. Some of the proceeds of corruption pass through offshore places facilitating secrecy and they are
unlikely to cooperate fully. In any case, various states would probably bring their national interests to bear on any
investigation, with the ﬁght against corruption taking a back seat. Evidently, much needs to be done to control supply-side
corruption.
The persistence of corruption highlights a failure of education at home, work, school, university and society. There is an
urgent need for a programof deschooling (Illich, 1974) so that corporate executives can recognize their contribution to social
problems. Corporations need to accept that they were created to serve society and must have legal responsibilities wider
than the simple pursuit of private proﬁts. Their records need to be publicly accessible so that all citizens can evaluate their
activities and call them to account. Individuals need to be detoxiﬁed from the neoliberal obsession with accumulation of
wealth, power and status.Without this, programs of surveillance and internal controlsmay achievemarginal success, but are
unlikely to make a signiﬁcant dent in curbing corrupt practices.
There is also an urgent need for further research into socialization of individuals into corporate culture which incubates
corrupt practices. The accounts of ‘insiders’ (Perkins, 2004) can do much to illuminate contradictions of organizational
practices which are frequently designed to present a legitimate face to the outside world whilst internal dynamics are
engaged in headlong rush for private proﬁts, at almost any cost.
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